Background: Meta-analyses show that hospital rapid response systems (RRS) are associated with reduced rates of cardiorespiratory arrest and mortality. However, many RRS fail to provide appropriate outcomes. Thus an improved understanding of how to succeed with a RRS is crucial. By understanding the barriers and facilitators within the limbs of a RRS, these can be addressed.
Introduction
The implementation of rapid response systems (RRS) to improve patient safety is strongly supported by quality improvement organizations such as the Institute of Healthcare Improvement, 1 and is recommended in international guidelines. 2À4 A successful RRS may be defined as a hospital-wide system that ensures observations, detection of deterioration, and tailored response to ward patients. 5, 6 Time is essential, as delayed management has been associated with increase mortality. 7, 8 Two previous systematic reviews 5, 9 have found moderate-strength evidence that implementation of RRS is associated with reduced rates of cardiac arrest and mortality. However, because many RRS fail to provide appropriate outcomes, there is debate about their effectiveness, and how to evaluate them. 10À13 Studies focusing primarily on outcomes often have limited assessment of the context, processes or mechanisms leading to those outcomes, and thus provide limited explanations of why RRS work or do not work in clinical practice. 14 There is general consensus about what constitutes an RRS ( Fig. 1 ), but great variation in how RRS components are constituted and operate. 9 This highlights the need to identify the factors that contribute to their effectiveness in different operational contexts. If the RRS is not used as intended, expecting results is futile. Even if a hospital has officially implemented an RRS, compliance with the system may be low. 13, 15 Cultural barriers may persist, 5 and understanding these is highlighted as essential. 16 To improve our current understanding of the factors affecting the RRS we performed a systematic review based on the following question: "How do healthcare professionals perceive potential facilitators and barriers within the limbs of a RRS?"
Methods
The present systematic review was conducted according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) statement. 18 A broad search strategy was used to ensure inclusion of all relevant papers.
Search protocol and eligibility criteria
In October 2017 we systematically searched EMBASE, MEDLINE, CINAHL, Epistemonikos, Cochrane, PsychInfo, and Web of Science, for the period 2000À2017 and updated the search on March 20, 2019. The search terms used were: "rapid response team", "medical emergency team", "critical care outreach team", "evaluate", "implement", "utilize", "adopt", "success", "fail", and "barrier" (Appendix 1). An expert librarian assisted with this search.
Inclusion criteria
Papers published from January 1, 2010ÀMarch 20, 2019. Original research Peer reviewed Fig. 1 -The structure of a Rapid response system (RRS), adapted from the findings of the first Consensus Conference of Medical Emergency Teams. 17 The four limbs of the RRS 6 : The afferent limb: the systematic process of monitoring patients and detect deterioration supported by predefined criteria. The efferent limb: the response team with expertice in handling deteriorating patients. The team configuration most commonly used: Medical Emergency Teams (MET), often led by a physician from the ICU, Rapid Response Teams (RRT), in Australia used synonymous with MET, but in US often led by nurses. Critical Care Outreach Teams (CCO) most commonly used in UK, often staffed by ICU nurses. The administrative limb: oversees the system. Ensure personnel and equipment resources, training and education. The quality improvement limb: collect and report data, provide feedback and thereby improve the system.
All study designs Languages: English, Norwegian, Swedish and Danish. RRS with at least an afferent and an efferent limb.
Exclusion criteria
In consensus it was decided to exclude articles published before 2010, to focus on the newest publications. Articles on paediatric RRS and subgroups (example: pulmonary embolism RRT's, obstetric RRT's).
Study selection
We performed an initial screen of publications (3024) to remove duplicates, then read all titles and abstracts; full-text articles were retrieved if they appeared to meet the inclusion criteria and addressed the predefined review question. The full-text was also retrieved if the title and abstract gave insufficient information to allow immediate exclusion. Four papers used multiple designs, and only the qualitative component addressing the review question was included 19À22 (Fig. 2 ).
Data extraction
The data extraction process involved familiarization with and comparison of the included studies. The papers that addressed our research question used a qualitative approach, so we performed a qualitative content analysis 23 (Table 3 ). The findings were organized according to the four limbs of the RRS model ( Fig. 1 )
Quality and risk of bias
Study quality and risk of bias were evaluated using the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) tool 24 (Table 1) . Two papers were excluded because of low quality. 
Results
We included 21 qualitative papers in the final review ( Table 2) . Different terms used to describe the efferent limb were standardised in this review as RRT. Categories and themes that emerged in the analysis are presented in Table 3 . Findings connected to the efferent limb were intertwined with the afferent limb, thus presented under the headline 'The connection of the Afferent and Efferent limb'. Key findings are presented in Table 4 .
Administrative and quality improvement limbs
The barrier of disconnected leadership and vague lines of responsibility
The influence of leadership and vision Organizational leadership support 14, 25, 26 and having a missiondriven organization 25 were described as essential: " People who work in this hospital are really aware of our mission and they are committed to care for our patients and to our purpose" . 25 Conversely, poor governance associated with a lack of protocols or equipment, poor logistics and lack of commitment by senior staff and management were viewed as barriers. 27 Unclear protocols with lack of integration in handover processes Confusion around when to call the RRT and their optimal response 26À33 was a frequently reported barrier. By contrast, clear call-criteria, including the expectation that when in doubt, a call should be made, was described as a facilitator. 29 Normalization of breaches of RRS-protocol during busy periods were percieved to undermine the system. 34, 35 Cooperation and patient flow were facilitated by incorporating RRT events into the handover processes and daily use of early warning scores (EWS) in unit rounds. 22, 28 Inconsistent education Low priority of education regarding the RRS and management of deteriorating patients 14, 25, 30 was a barrier while training was a facilitator, 25, 27, 36 with an emphasis on joint training sessions between ward staff and the RRT 35 and the use of simulation-based training. 25 Training in the use of EWS as early as in university was described as a facilitator. 36 Physicians worrying the system could deskill junior physicians was a barrier, 33, 37 while viewing RRT calls as learning opportunities was a facilitator. 37, 38 Lack of equipment, personnel and integration with other hospital systems HCP described that the RRS increased workload, 14, 28, 35, 37, 38 and staff shortages were seen as a barrier. 21,27À29,31,38 An example was too few RRT respondents: " There is one [Registrar] in the whole hospital and there could be six [rapid response] calls at once, and how can they possibly get to six?" . 29 Nurses described applying an informal triage when wards were busy, allowing them to focus on sicker patients and reduce monitoring of other patients. 35 Not wanting to disturb a busy ICU-nurse or physician, 28, 29 or knowing the ICU was (continued on next page) 30 HCP describe lacking a system to determine how and when additional resources could be provided. 35 Other barriers were not having hospital-wide systems for end-of-life-care decisions and planning, 27, 38 pain management and palliative care services. 38 Missing electronic tracking of vital signs and non-integration of monitoring with other infrastructure was a barrier. 27 As were poorly designed documentation-charts, the simultaneous use of multiple charts 27, 32 and different scoring-systems within one hospital. 39 Unreliable, outdated, inefficient and poorly maintained equipment hindered the RRS. 21, 27 The value of involvement and continuous follow-up The involvement of HCP in continuous quality improvement was described as a facilitator. 25 The availability of training, followed up by local audits and positive written responses were considered important components to succeed with the RRS, 29, 34 as was a process for immediately addressing problems, such as the intimidation of nurses. 25 By contrast, conflict was created by audits focusing solely on nursing assignments and not on the behaviour of the responding physician. 34 EWS-audits lost their effect when staff did not receive feedback. 14 
The afferent limb
The barrier of underestimating complexity
The missing link between measuring and interpreting vital signs
Due to high workload, vital-sign measurements were made by the least-qualified; health-care assistants and students, 14, 21, 34 leading to an interval between the measurements and their interpretation. 21, 34 This was considered to increase the distance between nurses and patients 14, 21, 34 and to reduce vital-sign monitoring to a technical task. 14 Although technology was seen as a solution to facilitate monitoring, the time spent "doing the vitals" was also seen as an important opportunity to observe and interact with patients. 35 Challenges in the use of observation and documentation systems HCP perceived track and trigger charts 20 and EWS 22, 39 as valuable for increasing awareness about deteriorating patients, assisting physicians in prioritizing care 34, 39 and to enhance intraprofessional communication. 22, 36 Clearly defined documentation-charts and protocols made staff more confident about seeking help. 20, 32, 39 Ward staff reported using a combination of the call-criteria and their clinical judgement 14, 33, 40 : " It should be an in-hand system, but it shouldn't be the system. 14 It was a facilitator when nurses could call the RRT based on clinical impression and concern 29 or if they felt the primary physician/on-call physician was not "doing their job", was inexperienced, 40 or unavailable. 29, 33, 37, 40 The availability of real-time data via technological solutions facilitated the RRS by allowing doctors to access patient's vitals from other sites. However, this technology could be a barrier if access was cumbersome in emergency situations; e.g. having to log on to a computer. 39 Delays of vital-signs entry into the electronic health records could delay the detection of clinical deterioration. 31 Barriers were described in HCPs use of documentation systems, 22, 27, 28, 32 for example: charts had incomplete dataset and incorrectly calculated EWS, 14, 22 deliberately not documenting vitals in the electronic management system when wards were busy, seeing this as only a bureaucratic task 35 and documenting altered call-criteria for patients on loose notes. 28 The introduction of a chart with ranges rather than exact numbers resulted in double documentation or nurses having to estimate numbers when speaking with physicians 32 posing as barrier.
The customization by physicians of call-criteria for individual patients, was viewed as both a facilitator and a barrier. 19, 22, 28, 32 One publication described how this practice had resulted in both inappropriate changes to avoid alarms and reluctance to change criteria resulting in unnecessary activation. 28 The value of knowing the patient Continuity of care and knowing the patient were perceived as important for the detection of subtle changes. 20 Nurses valued clinical intuition to monitor patients and take extra vital-signs when concerned, but resented being instructed to do so, without a good reason, by junior physicians. 35 Not having time to " lay eyes on the patient" was perceived as a barrier. 31 HCP worried focusing on EWS might mean overlooking cues such as blood results and overall clinical assessment 22, 39 and decline in patient assessment skills. 19, 32 HCP reported that in daytime, they preferred to call the primary team rather than the RRT because of their familiarity with the patient's condition. 40 The complex inter-professional "knotworking" process HCP believing that the RRT brought expertise and could expedite transfer of patients to higher-level care and improved patient outcomes30 facilitated the RRS. However, the nature of the detection/decision-making process differed between nurses (hierarchical and protocol-based) and physicians (autonomous). 19, 27, 33, 34 The process of deciding whether to activate the RRT, were described by Kitto et al. 33 as "knotworking"; nurses and physicians constantly collaborated vertically (with senior colleagues) and horizontally (between nurse and physician) to identify the appropriate place for the RRT. Physician autonomy could be a barrier to this process, 19, 28, 32, 34 but when nurses could obtain help without seeking permission, the RRS was described as empowering. 29, 37 HCP described that calling the RRT could be a way of realigning the workload to ensure that other patients were not neglected. 29, 35, 37 Nurses reported that knowing they could get help from colleagues to care for other patients while attending a RRS event, was an important facilitator. 29, 30 The severity of clinical change The perceived severity of a patients clinical condition influenced the likelihood of a RRT activation, with high EWS 35 or abrupt/serious changes being an acceptable trigger for RRT calls. 31, 40 Physicians described the RRT as " . . . the go-to team to provide urgent diagnosis and periarrest resuscitation . . . " Being able to call the RRT when concerned was described as an important facilitator, 22, 36 but subtle clinical changes often required navigation around system obstacles. 14, 31, 34, 40 Nurses described being afraid the patient was not sick enough to require the call 26, 30 ; often waiting for "it to get worse", searching for support to validate clinical decisions 22, 26, 30, 31 or using closer monitoring to find an objective trigger to justify a call. 14, 31 In these situations, HCP highlighted the importance of communication, and the ability to articulate the exact patient problem clearly. 40 RRS protocol vs. reality Confusion and lack of clarity around protocols, 27, 31, 32 which introduced variations in response behaviour, 39 was reported as a barrier. Despite having a track and trigger system, escalation often went through the hierarchy of the system. 21, 40 Perceptions of the call-criteria influenced their usefulness. 14,19,26,28,30À32,35 Perceiving them as too sensitive 35 or nonspecific 22,31 created alarm fatigue. 19, 28, 32 Nurses believing they could handle the situation themselves, 30, 31, 35 HCP finding EWS and their own clinical judgement conflicting 14, 22 and disagreeing with the set parameters 26 were barriers. One publication described how it was regarded as acceptable for nurses to falsify observations if they felt the patient was okay, to avoid having to explain why they did not react to an abnormal parameter. 32 Omission of monitoring at night because of nurses concern about sleep deprivation was also reported. 35 The connection of the afferent and efferent limb
The barriers in lack of trust and respectful behaviour
The lack of interprofessional trust and challenges of collaboration Multiple papers reported that ward physicians or RRT members reprimanded, criticized or had a negative attitude toward a nurse who called the RRT. 19,25À27,29À31,33,35,37,40 Nurses' believed that this behaviour might be caused by ward physicians feeling of failure if the nurse called the RRT directly: «going over the head of the physician" . 25, 29, 31, 37 This, provoked by physicians fear of being seen as clinically inept 28, 40 or being ashamed to ask for help. 35 Junior physicians described fearing criticism by senior staff for activating the RRT, 27, 28, 34, 40 and had learned they should manage on their own. 34, 40 Ward nurses were also concerned about being seen as incompetent by the RRT. 26 ,29À31 Perceiving RRT-calls as a failure disrupted the collaboration with the RRT. 25 Ward nurses valued the RRT-nurse, regardless of " their place in the RRT" . 29 Having a dedicated full-time RRT-nurse working next to the ward nurses 25 or doing rounds on units, 31 were described as facilitators. Nurses also reported a lower threshold for calling a nurseled RRT, than a physician-led RRT. 36 One study reported that a nurseled RRT supported junior medical staff and facilitated communication with more senior staff, 39 but another reported that physicians found nurse-led RRT difficult to accept. 38 RRT-members acting as mentors for ward nurses30 and providing education for all ward staff 34, 37, 38 facilitated the RRS.
Nurses were more inclined to reach out to physicians with whom they had a good relationship, and considered to be skilled. 35 RRT-calls were facilitated by supportive, professional and caring RRT-members, 30, 35, 36 who confirmed the nurses' findings, and gave positive feedback. 29, 36 Conversely, differing task priorities between the RRT and the ward nurses were described as barriers. 38 Familiarity within the RRT and between RRT-members and ward staff was reported to enhance teamwork, especially under time-pressure. 25 However, rotation and varied positions of ward physicians made it difficult for the RRT to establish effective relationships. 38 Douglas et al. 19 stated that the effectiveness of an RRT was " depending entirely on the people within the team on that particular day" . A key factor in the effectiveness of the efferent limb, was reported to be the clinical expertise and crisis management skills. An RRT leader that managed to be " an information gatherer and willing to have a dialogue" , facilitated the function of the RRT. 25 By contrast, a lack of clear leadership could result in chaos. 26 When junior doctors were the first tier of response, they reported feeling out of depth and anxious, 28 and nurses rarely found their contributions helpful. 35 The RRS effectiveness was further compromised if the junior doctors only reluctantly alerted the next tier (more senior specialist). 28 Not knowing the patient It was considered a barrier to the efferent limb that the RRT lacked detailed knowledge of the patient's medical history. 28, 37, 40 
Discussion
In this systematic review, we explored facilitators and barriers within the limbs of the RRS as reported by HCP working within the system.
Major findings
A major barrier to succeed with a RRS seems to be the disconnection of the administrative and quality improvement limbs from the operational afferent and efferent limbs. The operational limbs often seem to be left operating on their own, dealing with inadequate monitoring and documentation systems, 14, 21, 22, 27, 28, 31, 32, 39 understaffing 21,27À29,31,38 inconsistent RRS education 14, 25, 30 and unclear protocols. 27, 31, 32 Our analysis further presents the complexity of operating within and between the operational limbs. HCPs interpretation of and confidence in the call-criteria1 4,19,22,28,30À32 and alarm fatigue 19, 28, 32 are barriers to be taken seriously. Interestingly, the possibility of customizing the call-criteria for an individual patient was described as both a facilitator and a barrier, perhaps underlining the complexity of this process. 19, 22, 28, 32 Our findings imply that it is important to incorporate clinical judgement as a valid call-criterion for both nurses and doctors. 14, 19, 22, 28 Lack of inter-professional trust may be one of the core barrier for succeeding with a RRS. HCP rapport being criticized and reprimanded when trying to follow the patient-centered intention of the RRS. 19,25À31,33,34,37 The conflicts between nurses and ward physicians regarding alerting the RRT seem to be enhanced in protocols where RRT is expected to be alerted directly, bypassing the ward physician. 25, 29, 31, 37 Involvement of the ward physician in RRT calls might reduce conflict and facilitate RRT activation. It might also counteract the barrier of physicians fearing that the RRT will interfere with treatment despite being unfamiliar with the patient`s medical history. 28, 37, 40 The RRT structure in the reviewed papers varies greatly (Table 4 ). This review highlights the importance of the members` clinical expertise and ability to work together for the patient 25,28 and a belief in inter-professional training and education to improve collaboration. 25, 36 Comparison with previous studies Incomplete implementation and sustainability of RRS remains a major issue. 13, 41 In this review the barriers for activation of the efferent limb were frequent and in line with the finding described by Chua et al. 42 By using the RRS model ( Fig. 1) in the analysing process, we found that root causes for major barriers and facilitators for RRS may lie within the administrative and quality improvement limbs. The importance of leadership, for successful system-wide implementation implies the involvement and alignment of leaders on all levels. 43, 44 Disconnected leadership has been identified be a significant factor in health-care organizations struggling to improve quality. 45 Jones et al. 46 emphasised that an RRS needs to be part of the hospitals overall plan. A variety of approaches is available to assist the process of achieving successful implementation. 47, 48 Successful systems engage in quality improvement which require commitment, focus on goals as well as on process, using data measurement and feedback. 2 Regarding activation of the RRT, alarm fatigue is a known barrier. 41 Douglas et al. 19 found that increased familiarity, agreement, and perceived benefit of activation-criteria increases the frequency of RRT activation. The ongoing development of a validated scoring system such as National Early Warning Score (NEWS), 49 might help to overcome these barriers. The value of involving the primary team in RRT-calls 50, 51 has also been demonstrated.
Previous research has highlighted inter-professional simulationbased training as a tool to improve both technical and non-technical skills. 52 Increased use of this approach might enhance the effectiveness of RRT in caring for deteriorating patients and breaking down silos between RRT and ward personnel.
By increasing the confidence and knowledge of nursing staff, training improves their ability to detect and handle clinical deterioration. 53 Wehbe-Janek et al. 54 suggested that a simulation-based training program could overcome system barriers and augment the use of RRT. Theilen et al. 55 demonstrated that regular in-situ simulation training of a paediatric RRT led to sustained improvement.
A RRS is a hospital-wide intervention with many interdependent parts and requires a complex chain of events to occur in a timely progression.
The health-care system is rapidly developing, continuously educating and employing new staff, integrating new technology and providing advanced care for patients with complex conditions. It is important to be aware that "Any change in a work system element interact and produces changes elsewhere in the work system". 56 Technological solutions to patient monitoring that alert staff and RRSpersonnel of deteriorating patients, 57À60 could facilitate afferent limb, but their integration should be carefully tested in clinical practice.
We believe in increased involvement of HCP in the continuous follow-up on results and the process within and between the limbs of RRS. We suggest focus on inter-professional simulation-based training to improve communication and collaboration.
Areas for future research
To find the keys to succeed with a RRS, research should study the barriers and facilitators within the administrative and quality improvement limbs, as they should have the power and budget to provide a solid foundation for the operational limbs.
Continuously connected and involved administrative and qualityimprovement limbs are essential to ensure the effectiveness of the operational limbs. 14, 25, 26 This work cannot be completed by a set date; it is a never-ending process.
Strengths and limitations
The strengths of this systematic review are its presentation of the perspectives of the HCP operating the RRS. It includes papers from 10 different nations, more than 20 hospital-systems and different professions, levels of experience and RRS structures, thus providing a broad picture of facilitators of and barriers to current RRS. Although there is great variation between health-care systems, we identified several common facilitators and barriers, which increases the transferability of the analysis.
Although the literature search aimed to be broad, the choice of search terms might have failed to identify papers with important additional insights. Because the studies included in the review were interview-based, sampled purposively or by convenience and always voluntary, inclusion bias may be an issue. As evident from the critical appraisal (Table 2) , most researchers do not adequately consider their relationship with the participants. This is a weakness, because the results of interviews are influenced by the moderator. Ethical considerations were handled differently in the studies, reflecting different countries and regions with different rules and regulations.
Conclusion
In this systematic review, we explored facilitators and barriers, as described by HCP, within all limbs of the RRS and their interconnections. The keys to succeed with RRS seem to lie in the administrative and quality improvement limbs. Clear leadership, the availability of consistent education and training, equipment, personnel and clear protocols were essential for the operational limbs. Further, we found that continuous work to mitigate barriers and improve the system was of key importance. We suggest increased use of interprofessional simulation-based training to increase technical and non-technical skills, establish inter-professional trust and build support for the RRS. Hospital environments change continuously with the employment of new staff, integration of new technology, and provision of more advanced care. Thus, to succeed with a RRS is a never-ending process.
